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Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.: The
Latest Chapter in the Second
Circuit's Continuing Struggle with
Fair Use and Unpublished Works
INTRODUCTON
On November 21, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit-in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.--affirmed
a district court decision that a biographer's "sparing use"2 of
excerpts from her subject's unpublished letters and journals did not
constitute copyright infringement under the fair use doctrine.3 The
book in question was a biography of Richard Wright-a prominent
African-American author4 who died in 1960-entitled Richard
Wright: Daemonic Genius.5  Ellen Wright, Richard Wright's
widow and the owner of the copyrights in his works, sued the
author Margaret Walker and the publisher Warner Books for
copyright infringement.6 The defendants responded by claiming
fair use and the courts agreed, holding that the author's use of
Richard Wright's works in her book was "fair."7
This decision represents the culmination of several years of
controversy in the Second Circuit regarding the application of the
fair use defense to unpublished works.' In Salinger v. Random
1. 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991), affig 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2. Id. at 734.
3. Id.
4. Richard Wright's two best-known works are Native Son and Black Boy. Id. See
MARGARET WALKER, RIcHARD WRimar. DAEmoNC GWros 382-84 (1988), for a
complete bibliography of Richard Wright's works.
5. Wright, 953 F.2d at 734.
6. Id.
7. II.
8. Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second Circuit Review: Fair Use Revisited,
N.Y. LJ., Dec. 30, 1991, at 3 ("With the possible exception of RICO, 'fair use' has
caused more confusion and debate than anything else in the Second Circuit").
See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back- The Law, of Biography, 43
STAN. L. REV. 299 (1991); Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief. Fair Use and
Unpublished Works, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & EN. LJ. 15 (1990); William M. Landes,
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House, Inc.9 and New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt
& Co. ("New Era P'),'° the Second Circuit interpreted the Su-
preme Court's decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises" to create a very strong presumption againsi
the fair use of unpublished materials by authors. Many publishers
believed that a virtual per se rule had been erected against the fair
use of unpublished works (particularly unpublished letters), making
it almost impossible for an author who quoted even modest
amounts from unpublished sources to defend himself against a
charge of infringement by claiming fair use. 2 Since biographers
and historians commonly make extensive use of unpublished docu-
ments, many people feared that these decisions would have a
"chilling" effect on authors, discouraging them from undertaking
Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic
Approach, 21 3. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1992); Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul?, 36 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 167 (1989); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105 (1990); Roger L. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play?,
37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 1 (1989); Jon 0. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection
of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 459 (1988); Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of
History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 12 (1989);
James L. Oakes, Copyright and Copyremedies Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFsTRA
L. REV. 983 (1990); Vincent H. Peppe, Fair Use of Unpublished Materials in the Second
Circuit: The Letters of the Law, 54 BRooK. L. REv. 417 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990);
Roger L. Zissu, Salinger and Random House: Good News and Bad News, 35 3.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 13 (1987); Roger L. Zissu, Salinger and Random House Part Ih
Fears Criticisms, 35 . COPYRIGHT Soc'y 189 (1987); Elizabeth A. Einig, Note, Salinger
v. Random House: A Biographer's Dilemma, 34 ST. LouIs U. L. 149 (1989); Harold
A. Ellis, Note, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: An Interim Report and a Modest
Proposal, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231 (1991); Lisa Vaughm Merrill, Note, Should Copyright
Law Make Unpublished Works Unfair Game?, 51 OHIO ST. L. 1399 (1990); Christopher
A. Murphy, Note, Salinger v. Random House, The Author's Interests in Unpublished
Materials, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103 (1987).
9. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
10. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
11. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
12. David Goldberg & Robert Bernstein, A Balanced View of Fair Use, N.Y. L.J,
Jan. 17, 1992, at 3 (publishing industry believed that a "virtual per se rule" existed
against the fair use of unpublished works in the Second Circuit). See also Bilder, supra
note 8, at 327.
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new works that relied on unpublished materials.'
This comment argues that Wright represents a significant step
forward in the process of reaching a reasonable compromise
between the needs of some authors to use unpublished manuscripts
and the legitimate rights of other authors to protect their property.
By holding that there is no per se rule barring the fair use of
unpublished works, the Second Circuit has returned to the idea that
fair use is a flexible "case-by-case" doctrine. However, because
the amount of allegedly infringing material in Wright was so
minimal, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, and because the
court distinguished Salinger and New Era I partly on this basis,
even authors who quoted modest amounts from unpublished
sources might still find themselves vulnerable to threats of
litigation.
Part I of this comment gives a brief history of the fair use
doctrine. Part II discusses the way that previous courts have
treated unpublished works under the fair use doctrine both before
and after the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act. Part II describes
,the Second Circuit's decision in Wright v. Warner. Part IV
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the decision as well as its
likely impact on future litigation in this area, and Part V reviews
the newly enacted -amendment to the Copyright Act regarding the
fair use of unpublished works. This comment concludes that this
new legislation should resolve the potential problems left open by
Wright, leaving future authors free to make reasonable use of
unpublished sources.
I. THE OmGINS OF FAIR UsE
Fair use is traditionally defined as "a privilege in others than
the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
13. Peppe, supra note 8, at 444-45; Landes, supra note 8, at 80. See also David A.
Kaplan, The End of tistory?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 80; R.Z. Sheppard, Foul
Weather for Fair Use, TRME, April 30, 1990, at 86. But see Zissu, Salinger and Random
House II, supra nWte 8, at 189 (arguing that the expectation in the legal and publishing
communities that Salinger would stifle the creation of new works was unjustified).
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reasonable manner without his consent."14  It is a judicially
created doctrine, the beginnings of which can be traced all the way
back to the courts of eighteenth century England. 5 Not long after
the enactment of the first copyright law-the Statute of Anne, in
1710-courts began to recognize the need of authors to make
limited use of other authors' work.1 6 Those courts recognized that
allowing authors to make reasonable use of pre-existing works
benefited the public by encouraging the creation of new works. 17
By contrast, enforcing the copyright monopoly too strictly would
strangle the free flow of ideas that the copyright law is intended to
encourage.18 A less commonly articulated-but still very impor-
tant-reason for the existence of fair use doctrine is that it provides
a way to permit all sorts of de minimus and socially accepted uses
of copyrighted material that just do not seem particularly inappro-
priate-uses that are, in a word, "fair."'
Fair use was first recognized in American jurisprudence in 1841
in Folsom v. Marsh,2" a case involving the use by a biographer of
George Washington's published letters. In this case, Judge Story
wrote that a "reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work" as long as his purpose is "fair and reasonable criticism."
However, if the user "cites the most important parts of the work,
with a view not to criticize, but to supersede the use of the original
work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed
in law a piracy."'2 Judge Story also identified three of the four
factors that are still used by courts today in deciding whether or
14. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHiT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Meeropol v.
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
15. WiiAm F. PATRY, THE FAIR Uss PRVILEE iN COPYPIGHT LAw 3 (1985).
16. Id.
17. Id. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307.
18. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d
57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
19. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1138.
20. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
21. Id. at 344-45.
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not a particular use is fair: "the nature of the new work," "the
quantity and value of the materials used," and the effect on the
market for "the original work."'3
After 130 years of judicial recognition,24 Congress codified the
fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976.s This statute
makes all of the copyright holder's exclusive rights in his work
specifically subject to the fair use exception.26 The legislative
history indicates that Congress meant to retain the previous
"judicial doctrine of fair use" and not to "change, narrow, or
enlarge it in any way."27 The history also indicates that fair use
as codified was intended to be a flexible doctrine that "the courts
must be free to adapt.., to particular situations on a case-by-case
basis.,, 8
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107,
specifies four non-exclusive factors that are to be considered in
determining whether or not a particular use is fair. They are: (1)
"the purpose and character of the use," (2) "the nature of the
copyrighted work," (3) "the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," and
(4) "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work."29
II. FAMr USE AND UNPUBLISHBED WORKS
Until the Copyright Act of 1976, only published works received
22. Id. at 349.
23. Id at 348.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 (fair use raised as a defense in "innumerable?' copyright
infringement cases before being codified in the 1976 Act). See, e.g., Rosemont Enters.,
366 F.2d 303 (example of application of fair use doctrine to modem, pre-1976 Act case).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660 (first American copyright act passed in 1790 and revised in
1831, 1870, and 1909).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
28. Id.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (1988).
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federal copyright protection. Unpublished works, if protected, were
protected by state law. 0 Under the pre-1976 common law
approach, unpublished works were generally not subject to fair
use.3 ' Courts regarded disseminating portions of an unpublished
work as usurping the author's common law right of first publica-
tion. In England, another major underlying reason behind the
greater protection accorded to unpublished works at common law
seems to have been a concern for the author's personal privacy. 3
In practice, however, courts made some limited exceptions to the
bar on fair use of unpublished works.34
The 1976 Copyright Act pre-empted state common law, making
published and unpublished works alike subject to federal protection
30. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
890 (1987).
31. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,550-51 (1985)
(quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284,299 (1907)); Fendler v.
Morosco, 171 N.E. 56 (N.Y. 1930); Golding v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 193 P.2d 153,
162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948), aft'd, 208 P.2d I (Cal. 1949); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 80 (Cal. 1950).
32. Golding, 193 P.2d at 162.
33. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 201-07 (1890). In this famous article, Brandeis and Warren cited the protection
given by the courts against the unauthorized publication of private writings as one
manifestation of the individual's "right to be left alone:' Id (quoting T. COOLEY, A
TREATSE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). According to Second Circuit Judge
Jon 0. Newman, when English common law courts enjoined the publication of private
writings, they did so not just to protect the author's right to first publication, but also to
protect his right not to publish at all; "[tQhis latter interest was personal, not economic."
Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, supra note 8, at 466. American
courts, however, were not "so generous" in protecting the privacy of authors. Id See
also Murphy, supra note 8, at 126-27.
34. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. "This absolute rule, however, was tempered
in practice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a given case, factors such
as implied consent through de facto publication on performance or dissemination of a
work may tip the balance of equities in favor of prepublication use." Id Patty argues
that this absolute protection for unpublished works at common law did not extend to
works that although technically unpublished were voluntarily disseminated to the public
by the author. Thus, if a play was publicly performed before the manuscript was
published, a critic could still quote from the dialogue in reviewing the work even though
it was technically unpublished. PATRY, supra note 15, at 76. The recipient of private
letters could also publish them in certain very limited circumstances such as to defend
himself in a court action. Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912).
[Vol. 3:175
FAIR USE AND UNPUBLISHED WORKS
from the moment they are fixed in tangible form3 5 The Act also
made all published and unpublished works subject to the fair use
exceptionO6 However, the legislative history of the Act indicates
that Congress still meant to retain an additional measure of
protection for unpublished works?7
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises?8 This case involved the use of
several excerpts from a "purloined" copy of President Ford's then-
unpublished memoirs by the author of an article for the Nation
magazine3 9 Harper & Row, Ford's publisher, sued the Nation
for copyright infringement and won at the trial court level; the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's decision, finding fair use. ° Obviously outraged by the
defendant's behavior in this case,41 the Supreme Court held that
fair use did not excuse the Nation's actions.' The Court stated
that the fact that the Ford manuscript was unpublished was a "key,
though not necessarily determinative factor" tending to negate a
defense of fair use 43 and that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the
author's right to control the first public appearance of his undis-
seninated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use."44
35. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95.
36. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95.
37. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552. In Harper & Row the Court specifically
rejected the argument that Congress meant the fair use doctrine to be applied equally to
both unpublished and published works under the 1976 Copyright Act. Id
38. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Until this case, there were only a few district court
decisions dealing directly with the application of the fair use defense to unpublished
works under the 1976 Copyright Act. See Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 732
(D. Ariz. 1985) (noting that fair use generally applied only to materials that were already
published, either expressly or de facto, and concluding that reading unpublished letters
aloud in classes did not constitute fair use); Schuchart & Assocs., Inc. v. Solo Serve
Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170,179 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that copying architectural
plans did not constitute fair use).
39. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
40. Id. at 543-44.
41. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1157-58.
42. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
43. Id. at 553 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-473, at 64 (1975)).
44. Id at 555.
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The Court noted that under the common law, fair use did not
apply to unpublished works,45 and it briefly discussed some of the
reasons why unpublished works received greater protection from
fair use. The Court emphasized that an author has the right to
decide both when his work will be made public and whether it will
be made public at all 46 The Court also spoke about authors' need
for a period of time to "groom" their works prior public dissemina-
tion47 and about the damage that releasing it prematurely could do
to the economic value of the work.48 Since President Ford's
memoirs had been scheduled for publication shortly after the
Nation "scooped" them, no privacy concerns were implicated in the
case and the Court down-played this factor.49
The Court rejected the Nation's argument that "first amendment
values" 50 entitled it to greater leniency under the copyright laws
due to the public importance of the contents of the Ford manu-
script.5' Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found that
the structure of the Copyright Act itself already addressed any first
amendment concerns by distinguishing "copyrightable expression
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas," and by according "latitude
45. Id. at 551.
46. Ia ("Publication of an author's expression before he has authorized its
dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether it will be
made public, a factor not present in fair use of published works.").
47. L at 555.
The period encompassing the work's initiation, its preparation, and its grooming
for public dissemination is a critical one for any literary endeavor. The
Copyright Act which accords the copyright owner the right to control the first
public distribution of his work... echoes the common law concern that the
author or copyright owner retain control throughout this critical stage.
L (citing Joseph R. Re, Comment, The Stage of Publication as a "Fair Use" Factor:
Harper & Row v Nation Enters., 58 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 597 (1984)).
48. IL ('he author's control of first public distribution implicates not only his
personal interest in creative control but also his property interest in exploitation of
prepublication rights .... ").
49. IaL at 554-55 ('It is true that common-law copyright was often enlisted in the
service of personal privacy .... In its commercial guise, h6wever, an author's right to
choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protection").
50. Id at 555.
51. Id. at 555-560.
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for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use."' 2
In 1983, Ian Hamilton, a well-known literary biographer, began
work on a biography of J.D. Salinger, the famous American author
of The Catcher in the Rye. 3 He requested Salinger's cooperation
but Salinger refused, saying that "he preferred not to have his
biography written during his lifetime."54 Hamilton chose to
proceed with the project anyway. In order to write the book, he
utilized several collections of Salinger's letters that had been placed
in university libraries by the letter recipients.' In 1986, Salinger
filed suit to block publication of the book arguing that it violated
his copyright in these unpublished letters.56
Judge Leval of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York refused to enjoin publication of the work on
the grounds that Hamilton's use of Salinger's letters was fair.!7
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that
Salinger was entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent the
biography's publication.53 In applying the Copyright Act's four-
factor fair use test to the biography, the Second Circuit placed
particular emphasis on the unpublished nature of Salinger's
letters.59 Relying on Harper & Row, the court stated that unpub-
lished works "normally enjoy complete protection against copying
any protected expression."2
60
Two years later, the Second Circuit faced another case involv-
ing the fair use of unpublished works by a biographer. In New Era
52. Ia at 560.
53. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92.
54. Ia
55. Id at 92-93.
56. Ia at 94. Under copyright law as it applies to private letters, the writer of the
letters retains the copyright in his work even though the recipient has the right to physical
possession of the letter which includes the right to sell or give it away. Ia at 94-95;
Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109 (Mass. 1912).
57. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413,426 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd,
811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
58. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100.
59. Ia at 97.
60. IL This decision was heavily criticized. See, e.g., Peppe, supra note 8; Einig,
supra note 8; but see Murphy, supra note 8.
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Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co. 61 ("New Era
I"), representatives of the deceased L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the
Church of Scientology, sought to enjoin an unflattering biography
of him entitled Bare-Faced Messiah: The True Story of L. Ron
Hubbard on the grounds that it infringed copyrights in his pub-
lished and unpublished writings. 62 The district court, with Judge
Leval again presiding, reluctantly concluded that under Salinger the
use of the unpublished works was not fair, even though the author
had a compelling reason for quoting from these unpublished
texts.63 Judge Leval refused to issue an injunction, however,
because of first amendment considerations.64
On appeal, the Second Circuit again emphasized the importance
to its fair use determination of the status of Hubbard's works as
unpublished. 65 The court stated that "where use is made of
materials of an 'unpublished nature' the second fair use factor has
yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so
here." 66 The majority of the court also rejected the distinction
that the district court had tried to make between an author like the
one in Salinger who uses unpublished works in order to "enliven"
his own text and one who quotes from such documents in order to
prove "significant points."67 The Second Circuit did ultimately
affirm the district court's decision not to enjoin publication of the
book but only on the basis of laches 68
Concerned about some of the Second Circuit's statements in
61. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
62. Id at 577.
63. New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1524-
25 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
64. New Era 1, 695 F. Supp. at 1528 ("Tlhis is one of those special circumstances
in which the interests of free speech overwhelmingly exceed the plaintiff's interest in an
injunction:').
65. New Era I, 873 F.2d at 583.
66. It
67. Id The concurring opinion accepted this distinction and criticized the majority
for casting Salinger "in concrete." Id at 585 (Oakes, C.1., concurring).
68. Id. at 584 ('The prejudice suffered by Holt as the result of New Era's
unreasonable and inexcusable delay in bringing the action invokes the bar of laches.").
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New Era , the defendants took the "unprecedented" step of
petitioning the Second Circuit for a rehearing of the case by the
full court even though they had prevailed on the merits.69 The
Second Circuit denied the petition, but the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions to the decision to deny the petition for rehearing
seemed to indicate that the court's position regarding the fair use
of unpublished works was softening70
The New Era I and Salinger decisions caused considerable
controversy. They raised fears that it would be impossible for
authors to make even minimal use of unpublished sources without
risking an infringement suit.7' The New Era I decision, in
particular, created the possibility that the subject of a critical
biography or his heirs could manipulate the copyright laws to keep
unflattering information from reaching the public.72
The judges of the Second Circuit were divided on the issue and
publicly debated it. Judge Leval advocated limiting the extra
protection given to unpublished works to cases where the works
were actually intended for publication at some point.73 Judge
Miner of the United States. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
advocated strong protection for unpublished works but would have
allowed fair use for works that were "voluntarily disseminated to
the public," including private letters!' Judge Newman, also of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, indicated that he
would give greater protection if the work was both unpublished and
69. New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 E.2d 659, 660 (1989)
(denial of petition for rehearing en bane).
70. Id. at 661. Judge Miner, the author of the majority opinion in New Era I
indicated that the copying of "small amounts of unpublished expression!' might be
allowed. Id
71. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
72. See Conley, supra note 8, at 49-50.
73. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note 8, at 1119. Judge Leval focused
on the utilitarian purpose of the copyright law, namely to promote the creation of new
works. Ia at 1108-09. He argued that the economic incentive to produce new works
only applied to authors who wrote with the intention of publishing their works one day.
Id at 1117. Therefore, he argued, allowing greater fair use of works that were never
intended for publication would not discourage writers from composing private letters or
keeping journals. Ia at 1117-19; see also Leval, Fair Use or Foul, supra note 8.
74. iner, supra note 8, at 10-11.
19921
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private.75
These concerns began to ease a bit with the Second Circuit's
subsequent decision in New Era Publications International ApS v.
Carol Publishing Group76 ("New Era IF'). This case involved
another attempt by the heirs of L. Ron Hubbard to enjoin the
publication of an unauthorized biography by claiming copyright
infringement.77 This time, however, only Hubbard's published
works were at issue.7" The Court of Appeals found that the
defendant's quotations from Hubbard's writings constituted fair use
since the author used the quotes, not for their expressive content,
but rather "to convey the facts contained therein" and to support
the author's opinion that Hubbard was a pompous hypocrite.79
Meanwhile, however, publishers and writers groups pushed for
legislation in Congress to amend the fair use provision of the
copyright statute. A bill was introduced that attempted to modify
the fair use section of the Copyright Act to eliminate the distinction
between published and unpublished works.8" The computer indus-
try strongly opposed these bills. Since most software is technically
unpublished, the computer industry feared that amending the fair
use statute in this manner would make it more difficult to protect
computer programs from unauthorized copying.8' There were also
concerns that this proposal would not adequately protect authors'
right to first publication.' In any case, the legislation was
withdrawn by its sponsor before any vote was taken on it.83
75. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, supra note 8, at 476-77.
76. 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990). See Roger L. Zissu,
Fair Use Law Enters New Era, NAT'L L.., June 17, 1991, at 17.
77. New Era 11, 904 F.2d at 153.
78. Id. at 157.
79. IM at 156.
80. See H.R. 4263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2370, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990).
81. Roger Cohen, Software Issue Kills Liberal Amendment to Copyright Laws, N.Y.
TrMES, Oct 13, 1990, at Al; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Recent United States
Copyright Reforms: Congress Catches the Spirit of Berne, 2 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA &
IMr=LL. PROP. L.F. 7, 24 (1991).
82. Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 12.
83. Cohen, supra note 81, at Al.
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A new weaker proposal was introduced in the 102nd Con-
gress.8 This legislation would have amended the fair use section
of the Copyright Act to say that unpublished status "tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use" but that it would "not bar a finding
of fair use."' s The bill passed the Senate, but the House version
was dropped before reaching the floor, apparently in anticipation
of the Second Circuit's upcoming decision in Wright v. Warner.6
IlH. WRIGHT V. WARNER BOOKS, INC.
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc. is the first case in the Second
Circuit since New Era I to deal directly with the fair use of
unpublished booksY Like Salinger8 and New Era I, Wright
involves the use of unpublished manuscripts by a biographer.89
Margaret Walker, a university professor and friend of the late
Richard Wright, began a book about him during the seventies.9"
Ellen Wright, the author's widow and the owner of his copyrights,
would not give Walker permission to use Wright's works unless
she was allowed to read the manuscript of the biography prior to
84. S. 1035, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2372, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
85. IdM
86. Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 12. Amended Copyright, PTO Authorization
Bills Approved by House Subcommittee, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A13 (Oct.
2, 1991).
87. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1094 (1990). New Era H involved the fair use of published works only. One
district court case during this time did address the issue of the fair use of unpublished
writings. Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). This case
foreshadowed the Second Circuit's decision in Wright by first stating that since the
majority of plaintiffs works were unpublished, factor two favored the plaintiffs. The
court still found that the use was fair since all three of the other factors favored the
defendants. Id. at 1066-67. However, there was some doubt in this case as to whether
the defendants ever had the necessary access to the plaintiff's unpublished writings to
establish infiingement in the first place. Id. at 1064 n.23. See also Bernstein &
Goldberg, supra note 12.
88. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
89. 953 F.2d at 734.
90. Wright Bio Ruling Eases Fair Use Restrictions, PUBLISHFRS WKLY., Dec. 20,
1991, at 15.
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its publication. 1 Walker refused to agree to these terms, viewing
them as "prior restraint tantamount to censorship," and the book
became an unauthorized biography.'
Walker revised the manuscript five times in response to
complaints and threats of legal action by Ellen Wright.3 The
version that was eventually published in 1988 contained references
to Richard Wright's published and unpublished works including
letters that Wright had sent to Walker and entries from his
journal,94 which had been sold to Yale University Library by his
estate for $175,000. 95
Ellen Wright filed suit in May 1989 for copyright infringement,
false designation of origin, breach of contract, and libel.96 The
district court, Judge Walker of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit sitting by designation, found that Professor Walker's use of
both the published and published works was fair, and he granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment.97
The district court found that all four fair use factors, with
regard to the unpublished works, favored the defendants. In its
analysis of factor two-the nature of the copyrighted work-the
court acknowledged that a work's unpublished status is "critical"
to the determination of fair use. The court concluded, however,
that for several reasons factor two still favored the defendants. 8
In regard to the journal entries, the author paraphrased rather than
quoting from the protected works, and the paraphrasing merely
reported the facts.99 Further, in contrast to Salinger, Wright's
91. MARGARET WALKER, RiCHAD WRGHT: DABMOmC GENIs xvi (1988).
92. Id
93. PUBLISHERS WKLY., supra note 90.
94. 953 F.2d at 731.
95. Id at 740.
96. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
97. Id. at 113-14. The court also granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the breach of contract claim. The plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the
allegation of false designation of origin, and the court dismissed the libel claim for want
of federal jurisdiction. Id- at 115.
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death eliminated any privacy considerations.'0° The court also
noted that in further contrast to Salinger, the plaintiff herself had
arranged for these journals to be placed in a library where scholars
would have access to them.' ' As for the letters, the court
recognized that Walker had "used the letters not to recreate
Wright's creative expression, but simply to establish facts necessary
to her biography. . . ."'02 Therefore, the court held, the biogra-
phy had not taken anything protected by copyright law.
This issues were narrowed on appeal; only the alleged infringe-
ment of the Wright's unpublished works and the breach of contract
claim remained for the Second Circuit to consider.0 3 Although
the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's analysis with
respect to factor two, it nevertheless affirmed the decision that
defendant's use of the unpublished works was fair.'
Judge Meskill, writing for the majority, first addressed the issue
of whether the allegedly infringing portions of the unpublished
works conveyed protected expression or only unprotected facts
(since copyright law protects only the expression of facts or ideas
and not the underlying substance of them).05 The court found
that "under a liberal interpretation of the fact/expression dichoto-
my," three paraphrased excerpts from Wright's unpublished
journals and four quotations from Wright's letters to Walker
constituted copyright infringement unless the fair use defense
applied.1'6
The court then proceeded to evaluate these protected passages
against the four statutory fair use factors.'07 In regard to factor
one, the circuit court agreed with the district court that the purpose
100. Id at 111.
101. Id. at 110.
102. Id. at 111.
103. 953 F.2d at 734-735.
104. Id at 734.
105. Id. at 736. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
106. 953 F.2d at 736. Fair use is an affirmative defense. See Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 561. It assumes that infringement does exist. Wright, 953 F.2d at 743 (Van
Graafeiland, I., concurring).
107. For a list of the four fair use factors, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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and character of the use favored the defendant, since Professor
Walker's work was a scholarly biography.0 8 It also agreed that
factors three and four, the quantity used and the effect on the
market, favored defendant."° The court emphasized in particular
Walker had used less than 1% of the material contained Wright's
journals and letters.110 The court also stated that, qualitatively,
the defendant had not taken the "hear' out of the "copyrighted
work,""' and that Walker used the "borrowed expression" to
"enhance her analysis" and to "establish credibility."'1 2  The
author's use of the protected works did not "make the book worth
reading""' 3 and did not "pose a significant threat to the potential
market for Wright's letters or journals.""' 4
The Second Circuit disagreed, however, with Judge Walker
regarding factor two-the nature of the copyrighted work-stating
that the district court gave "insufficient weight to the unpublished
status of the letters and journal entries."'" 5 The court rejected
Judge Walker's rationale'for finding that factor two favored the
defendants." 6  It stated that although considerations such as
whether the defendant paraphrased or quoted, whether the defen-
dant borrowed fact or expression, and whether the author's privacy
was compromised could "enter into the infringement equation" and
could be used to overcome the presumption against the fair use of
unpublished works, they had "no bearing on factor two" in the case
at bar."' According to the court, once a work is shown to be
unpublished, "[o]ur precedents then, leave little room for discussion
108. 953 F.2d at 736.
109. Id. at 738-39.
110. Id. at 738.
111. Id. at738 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65). The "passages" quoted
and paraphrased by Walker had "no plausible parallel in the critical passages taken from
President Ford's memoir discussing his decision to pardon President Nixon, which indeed
were the 'heart' of that copyrighted work." 1d
112. Id. at739.
113. Id. at 739 (citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 737.
116. Id. at 737-38.
117. Id.
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of this factor... .,,1 Factor two favored the plaintiffs. 9
The court concluded, however, that the use was fair because
three of the four fair use factors clearly favored the defendants;
accordingly, it affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.'2 The court held that while factor two favoring the
plaintiff (due to the unpublished nature of the works) was an
"obstacle" to finding fair use, it was not an "insurmountable
one.'' The court then laid to rest the worst fears of the critics
of Salinger and New Era I by categorically stating that neither of
these cases "erected a per se rule regarding unpublished
works."" A defendant does not have to win on -every factor in
order to prevail in establishing fair use.'' "' he fair use test,"
stated the court, "remains a totality inquiry, tailored to the particu-
lar facts of each case."'24
In a concurring opinion, Judge Van Graafeiland argued that the
amount of infringing material was so little that the case could have
been resolved in the defendant's favor without ever reaching the
subject of fair use.' 5 He concluded that the majority placed "too
much emphasis on the unpublished nature of Wright's words in
discussing factor (2) of 17 U.S.C. § 107.,,126
IV. ANALYSIS OF WRIGHT v. WARNER BOOKS, INC.
By establishing that there is no per se rule against the fair use
of unpublished works, 27 the Second Circuit took the first step
118. d at 737.
119. Id at738.




124. Id The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's
breach of contract claim.
125. Wright, 953 F.2d at 743 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) ('The defense of fair
use assumes the existence of infringement. In my opinion, if there is any infringement
in the instant case, it is technical at best and so de minimis as not to be actionable.").
126. Id.
127. Of course, as the Wright court correctly noted, none of the Second Circuit's
earlier decisions ever established such a hard and fast rule, but that was still the
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toward reaching an acceptable compromise between the needs of
some authors to make reasonable use of unpublished documents
and the rights of other authors to protect their writings. There
should be a presumption against the fair use of unpublished works.
Giving greater protection to unpublished writings serves several
legitimate policy objectives 2 ' and is in accord with the legisla-
tive history of the fair use section of the Copyright Act of
1976,29 not to mention the Supreme Court's decision in Harper
& Row v. Nation Enterprises.130  However, making this presump-
tion an absolute one would unnecessarily restrict the creation of
new works.131 Thus, as Wright demonstrates, the presumption
against the fair use of unpublished works should be a rebuttable
one.
Under Wright, the plaintiff in an infringement suit involving
unpublished works is essentially guaranteed to win on at least one
of the four fair use factors whenever an alleged infringer raises this
defense." Once the work is determined to be unpublished, the
plaintiff almost automatically prevails on factor two, the nature of
the copyrighted work. 33  However, the defendant can still rebut
the presumption against fair use if she can show that, at a mini-
mum, the other three fair use factors favor her.'34 Of course, it
impression held by many in the publishing industry. This belief alone was enough to
create a "chilling" climate for books that relied on unpublished sources. See Newman,
Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, supra note 8, at 12
(expressing concern that lawyers were advising their clients to delete all references to
unpublished works from their manuscripts).
128. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
129. The common law protected unpublished works more stringently from fair use
and the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that Congress meant to
adopt the principles that the courts had established at common law regarding fair use. See
supra notes 27, 30-34 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
131. Leval, Fair Use or Foul, supra note 8, at 173 ("When we place all unpublished
private papers under lock and key, immune from any fair use for periods of 50-100 years,
we have turned our backs on the Copyright Clause.").
132. Wright, 953 F.2d at 737 ("Unpublished works are the favorite sons of factor
two.... Our precedents then, leave little room for discussion of this factor once it has
been determined that the copyrighted work is unpublished.").
133. Id
134. ME at 738. See also Axica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056, 1066-67
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would not hurt if she could show that additional factors favor her
as well.135
One question that still remains is how strong the defendant's
showing under the other three factors will have to be in order to
overcome the presumption against the fair use of unpublished
works. Future courts will have to delineate further exactly how
much expressive material an author may fairly copy from unpub-
lished works.
Unfortunately, the emphasis that the court placed throughout
Wright on the small amount of expressive material used by the
defendant,136 combined with the fact that the court distinguished
Salinger and New Era I partially on this basis, 137 implies that
future authors who quote or paraphrase even modest amounts from
unpublished sources may still find themselves vulnerable to threat
of suits for copyright infringement.
Most legitimate authors who act in good faith will have little
difficulty satisfying the requirements of factor one-the purpose
and character of the use. In section 107 of the Copyright Act of
1976, Congress specifically listed "scholarship," "research," and
"criticism" as illustrations of the types of use that may be fair."'
"IThere is a strong presumption that factor one favors the
defendant if the allegedly infringing work fits the description of
uses described in section 107.''139 In all the Second Circuit cases
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
135. Wright, 953 F.2d at 737-38.
136. Id at 734 (characterizing defendant's use as "sparing"). "Dr. Walker used no
more than one percent of the Wright/Walker letters or journal entries.... While this
percentage may be higher with respect to the letters alone, it is clear that Dr. Walker
utilized a very small portion of those letters." Id. at 738. "Mhe expressive portions
comprise a slight fraction of the biography-at most, two pages of a 428 page book." Id.
at 739.
137. Id at 739 ('In contrast to Salinger and New Era I, marginal amounts 'of
expressive content were taken from Wright's works."). "In short, this is not a reprise of
Salinger and New Era L The biography's use of Wright's expressive works is modest and
serves either to illustrate factual points or to establish Dr. Walker's relationship with the
author, not to 'enliven' her prose." Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
139. Wright, 953 F.2d at 736.
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discussed in this comment-Salinger, New Era I, New Era H, and
Wright-the court found that factor one favored the defendant.' 40
Thus, future cases regarding the fair use of unpublished works
will probably turn on factors three and four-the amount copied
and the effect of the new work on the market for the original one.
As regards factor three, the allegedly infringing material in Wright
was so minimal in both quality and quantity'41 that even authors
who make reasonable use of unpiblished manuscripts may still
have difficulty prevailing on this factor.
However, in regard to factor four-the effect on the mar-
ket-Wright represents a more mixed development for the alleged
infringer seeking to justify his use of unpublished materials on the
basis of fair use. On one hand, the court again distinguished
Salinger and New Era I in its factor four analysis, finding that
some "marginal amounts of expressive content were taken from
Wright's works."' 42  On the other hand, Wright does bring the
Second Circuit's analysis 'of this factor" into better relationship
with economic reality.' While it may be granted that interfering
with an author's right to control the first public appearance of his
work can severely diminish its value,' 44 it is difficult to under-
stand how even extensive paraphrasing of Salinger's letters in a
biography could have a real impact on the market for a future
140. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96; New Era I, 873 F.2d at 583; New Era 1, 904 F.2d at
157; Wright, 953 F.2d at 736.
141. Id at 740.
While the biography draws on works that we have characterized as unpublished
for the purposes of this appeal, it takes only seven protected segments from
Wright's letters and journals. These portions are short and insignificant with
the possible exception of a fifty-five word description of the art of writing.
This use is de minimis and beyond the protection of the Copyright Act.
Id
142. Id at 739.
143. After New Era I and Salinger, some commentators had feared that once a work
was classified as unpublished, the defendant would automatically lose not only on factor
two-nature of the copyrighted work-but also on factor four-effect on the market. See,
e.g., Leval, supra note 8, at 175; Bilder, supra note 8, at 534 n.218.
144. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555. In this case, the "scooping" of President
Ford's memoirs had a clear and discemable effect on their market value. Id. at 567-68.
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collection of his letters.145 It is even harder to fathom how the
use of L. Ron Hubbard's letters in a critical biography of him
could undermine the market for a collection of such works later
published by his heirs.146
In Wright, the court correctly held that there was little likeli-
hood that the biography could replace or compete with a published
collection of Richard Wright's letters aid journals.'47  This
finding was much more in accord with the Second Circuit's
analyses of the "effect on the market' factor in cases before
Salinger. The discussions in these prior cases either concentrated
on whether or not the allegedly infringing work could replace the
original one in the market place or they demanded some relatively
specific indications of how the market for the original work would
be impaired. 48
Another question that future cases will have to address is what
additional factors-beside the four statutory ones-courts should
take into consideration in deciding if a particular defendant has
overcome the presumption against fair use of unpublished works.
The Wright court acknowledged that whether or not the "use
implicates the author's privacy considerations" is one such fac-
tor.149  The desire to protect authors' privacy has definitely
145. See Peppe, supra note 8, at 457.
146. See Roger L. Zissu, Fair Use Law Enters New Era, NAT'L L.I., June 17, 1991,
at 17.
147. Wright, 953 F.2d at 739 ("[E]ven if [publication of Wright's letters] were to go
forward, we can see no likelihood of harm.").
148. See Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 311 (biography of Howard Hughes did not
compete with a series of magazine articles or lessen their value); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (impact of book about Julius and Ethyl Rosenberg on the
market for their collected letters not clear), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Iowa State
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980) (use of 8% of a student film in a network broadcast would cause at least some
impairment of its market value, particularly in regard to future television sales); Maxtone-
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986) (market for pro-choice book
containing a sympathetic interviews with women discussing their abortions would not be
affected by use of small portions of it in pro-life essay), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059
(1987). See Peppe, supra note 8, at 455.
149. Wright, 953 F.2d at 738. The court also stated that "whether [or not] the
infringer paraphrased or copied, [or] whether he borrowed fact or expression" would be
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influenced courts to protect unpublished works more strictly.150
In cases where there is no issue as to whether the copyright law
should be used to protect the personal privacy of the author' 5'
(such as in Wright where the author had been dead for a number
of years), courts should give less weight to the fact that a work is
unpublished as an argument against fair use.5
Also, courts should consider whether an author has made an
effort to keep her work private.153  The greater protection that is
usually accorded to unpublished works should not be available to
works that, although technically unpublished like Wright's journals,
have been voluntarily and publicly disseminated.'5 4 As Judge
Walker pointed out in his district court opinion in Wright, the
copyright holder herself arranged to place some of the unpublished
materials in a library where the public would have access to them,
and she received a great deal of money for doing so.' 55 Such
was not the case in Salinger. -Under any reasonable sense of
equity, a copyright holder such as Ellen Walker-who retained the
relevant to a defendant trying to overcome the burden placed on those "who seek to
justify use of unpublished materials." Id
150. New Era I, 873 F.2d at 585 (Oakes, CJ., concurring). This was particularly
true in the Salinger case. "Salinger is a decision which, even if rightly decided on its
facts, involved underlying, if latent, privacy implications. .. ." New Era I, 873 F.2d at
585 (Oakes, CJ., concurring). The court's "tacit agenda" in Salinger was protecting the
author's personal privacy. Peppe, supra note 8, at 458.
151. This issue has been extensively debated. Judge Newman, for example, argues
that:
In litigation under the federal statute . . . the privacy interest should be
recognized and weighed carefully. It should not always prevail. Yet it ought
not be ignored. Copyright law seeks to promote the useful arts. This task
requires some zone of privacy in which each of us may not only formulate our
thoughts but also commit them to paper.
Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, supra note 8, at 477. See also
Miner, supra note 8, at 9. Judge Leval, however, vigorously opposes the idea that
privacy should enter into decisions under the copyright law. See Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, supra note 8, at 1137.
152. Newman, Copyright and the Protection of Privacy, supra note 8, at 475
(arguing that the protection of an author's privacy interest in his unpublished writings
should not extend for more than three to five years after his death).
153. Bemstein & Goldberg, supra note 12.
154. See supra notes 34, 74.
155. Wright, 748 F. Supp. at 110.
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copyright and the sole right to publish her husband's
works-certainly abandoned any expectations of privacy in these
documents and must be chargeable with knowledge that scholars
and others would make reasonable use of the works. 6
V. TH NEW AMENDMENT TO 17 U.S.C. § 107
The Wright decision "did not explicitly disavow" ' the
Second Circuit's statement in Salinger that unpublished works
"normally enjoy complete protection against copying any protected
expression.' ' 5 8 As a result, the publishing industry remained
concerned about the "pall" cast on authors' use of unpublished
material by Salinger and New Era L'59  In response to this
concern, William J. Hughes, a United States Representative from
New Jersey, introduced an amendment to the fair use provisions of
the Copyright Act to deal specifically with unpublished works. 60
Representative Hughes' bill-H.R. 4412, introduced on March
5, 1992-amends the end of 17 U.S.C § 107 to read: "The fact
that a work is unpublished shall not by itself bar a finding of fair
use if such a finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors."' 6' The bill was approved by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee on April 30, 1992, and the entire House passed it on August
11. The bill passed the Senate on October 7,162 and President
Bush signed it on October 25.163 It is now the law. 6"
156. See Wright; 953 F.2d at 74041 (discussing plaintiff's claim that the defendant
breached her agreement with Yale University Library by quoting from the Wright
manuscripts that had been deposited there).
157. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FAIR UsE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, H.R.
REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1992).
158. Id. (citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97).
159. 138 CoNG. REc. S17,358 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sens. Simon,
Leahy, Kennedy, Grassley, Metzenbaum, and Kohl).
160. Copyright Bill Clarifying Fair Use of Unpublished Works Clears Congress,
Wash. Insider (BNA) (Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Bill Clears Congress].
161. -.RL REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992). The original version of this
legislation directed courts to examine "all the factors set forth in paragraphs (1) through
(4)" of section 107. This language was changed in order to make it clear that the courts
may consider additional factors besides those listed in the statute.
162. Bill Clears Congress, supra note 160.
163. President Signs Bill on Fair Use, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA),
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According to the House Committee Report accompanying H.R.
4412, the purpose of the amendment is "to clarify the intent of
Congress that there be no per se rule barring claims of fair use of
[un]published works."'16 Instead, Congress directs the courts to
determine the affirmative defense of fair use of unpublished works
on a case-by-case basis after considering the four statutory fair use
factors "as well as any other factors a court may find rele-
vant."'66 This legislation also overrules certain portions of the
Salinger decision that indicated that the "unpublished nature of the
work" leads to a diminished likelihood that the fair use defense as
a whole will be available in a given case.' 6
The legislation does not change the holding of Wright,68
although it does "reject any dicta" in this decision "to the extent
that such dicta is premised upon the disapproved language in
Salinger and New Era L"' 169 The amendment also preserves the
presumption against fair use of unpublished works that was
established by the Supreme Court in Harper & Row. 170
This amendment to the Copyright Act should help resolve the
difficulties that might have been caused by Wright's emphasis on
the minimal amount of copyrighted material used by the defendant.
Oct. 30, 1992.
164. Pub. L. No. 102-492 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 107).
165. H.R. REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992).
166. Id.
167. a at 8-9.
168. a at 8. The House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the amendment
states that "the Wright opinion properly balanced all the fair use factors." Id It also
states:
Each claim of fair use of an unpublished work should involve a careful
consideration of all four statutory fair use factors as well as any other factors
the court deems relevant. The decision of the Second Circuit in the Wright
opinion is instructive in this regard. At the same time, it is not the Committee's
intention to alter the weight currently given by the courts to the unpublished
nature of a work under the second fair use factor.
Id at 9.
169. 138 CONG. REC. S17,358 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sens. Simon,
Leahy, Kennedy, Grassley, Metzenbaum, and Kohl).
170. H.R1 REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) ("The general principles
regarding the fair use of unpublished works set forth by the Supreme Court in Harper &
Row v. Nation Enterprises still apply.").
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The Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the bill specifically
notes "that the Wright opinion did not reach the outer limits of
what might be regarded as fair use .... Certainly uses beyond
those permitted in Wright may also be fair use, depending on the
facts of a particular case." ' The amendment also overrules
certain portions of Salinger and New Era I concerning unpublished
works and any dicta in Wright premised on the language in these
decisions.' This should eliminate any possibility that a later
court will interpret Wright strictly, based upon the fact that the
Wright court distinguished Salinger and New Era I through its
finding that the alleged infringement in Wright was so minute.
CONCLUSION
In Salinger and New Era I, the Second Circuit interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row to create a very strong
presumption against the fair use of unpublished works. Many
people believed that a virtual per se rule had been created,
forbidding an author from making any use of unpublished sourc-
es.
173
In Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., the Second Circuit explicitly
rejected the idea that there was aper se rule against the fair use of
unpublished works." By doing so, it began the process of
creating a more reasonable rule that would accommodate the need
of authors to make use of unpublished writings while still preserv-
ing the presumption against fair use of unpublished works.
Under Wright, in an infringement case involving unpublished
works, the second fair use factor-the nature of the copyrighted
material-is automatically weighed against the defendant. A
171. Id. at 8. The Committee then gave two examples of other uses that might be
fair. situations where copying an author's unpublished expression is necessary to report
facts accurately, and cases where the statement itself is the fact "calling for comment."
Id (citing New Era 1, 695 F. Supp. at 1502).
172. 138 CoNG. REC. S17,358 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sens. Simon,
Leahy, Kennedy, Grassley, Metzenbaum, and Kohl).
173. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
174. Wright, 953 F.2d at 740.
1992]
200 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL PROP. LF.
defendant can rebut the presumption against the fair use of
unpublished works and can still prevail if he can show that the
other three statutory factors favor him, and perhaps if he can show
that other considerations favor him as well.175
Unfortunately, there was so little allegedly infringing material
at issue in Wright that future authors who used even minimal
amounts of unpublished material might still have found themselves
vulnerable to suits for copyright infringement. The fact that the
Second Circuit distinguished Salinger and New Era I partly on this
basis exacerbated this possibility.7 6
Dissatisfied with the limited nature of the Wright decision,
Congress recently enacted new legislation to amend 17 U.S.C. §
107. The amendment makes clear that no per se rule exists against
the fair use of unpublished works."7 This new legislation does
not change Wright's holding, but it should alleviate the major
deficiency of this decision. 17 Thus, future authors should now
be able to make reasonable use of unpublished sources without fear
of being subject to "unfair" suits for copyright infringement.
Ginger A. Gaines
175. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 136-137, 141 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 157-165.
178. See supra notes 168-172.
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